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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction to hear 
this matter pursuant to Section 78-2A-3(2)(a) of Utah Code Annot. 
This is an appeal from the Board of Review's Decision dated 
February 8, 1989, affirming the decision of the Administrative 
Law Judge's (hereinafter "ALJ") denial of unemployment compen-
sation benefits to appellant. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the Review Board erred in adopting the findings 
of the ALJ that appellant had ever asked for a blue slip, was in 
any way at fault as to an incident on February 12, 1988, had 
demonstrated that an effort to work out the problems would be 
futile, or whether appellant was presented with any real options 
on June 22, 1988. 
II. Whether the Review Board erred in holding that the 
denial of unemployment insurance benefits to appellant would not 
be unreasonably harsh or an affront to fairness under the law. 
III. Whether the decision of the Board of Review in ignoring 
a substantial part of the record evidence before it is contrary 
to the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Covington v. Board 
of Review, 737 P.2d 207 (Utah 1987). 
IV. Whether the Review Board erred in failing to consider 
the motives of appellant's employer, or appellant's health 
reasons in connection with appellant's termination from her work. 
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V. Whether the Review Board failed to properly interpret 
and apply Section 35-4-5 (a), (b) and (c) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
This Court's interpretation of the application of Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-4-5 (a), (b) and (c), to the facts and 
circumstances of this matter, is controlling as to whether 
appellant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. A copy 
of the applicable provisions of such statute is attached hereto 
in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a decision by Th€> Department of 
Employment Security, dated August 5, 1988, which denied 
unemployment benefits to appellant Sharon H. Merriam effective 
July 10, 1988, and continuing thereafter, on the grounds the 
appellant left work voluntarily without good cause and that a 
denial of unemployment insurance benefits would not be contrary 
to equity and good conscience pursuant to U.C.A. Section 35-4-5. 
After a hearing before Christopher W. Love, ALJ for the 
Department of Employment Security on September 6 and 13, 1988, 
Judge Love affirmed the Department representative's decision to 
deny appellant unemployment compensation benefits in an order 
dated November 18, 1988. Following a timely appeal by appellant, 
the Board of Review affirmed Judge Love's conclusions in a 
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Decision dated February 8, 1989, Appellant timely filed a 
Petition for Writ of Review and Docketing Statement in the Utah 
Court of Appeals, arguing the same points which appellant found 
objectionable in the decision of the ALJ, which issues are 
presented above. 
Statement of Facts. 
The facts of this case pertinent to the defendant's appeal 
are as follows ("R." stands for "Record"): 
1. Sharon H. Merriam (hereinafter "Sharon") began working 
at Nordstroms on February 5, 1982, at the wage of about $4.25 per 
hour. R. at 57, 64. 
2. After several months, Sharon began receiving increases 
in wage and responsibility, and continued to do so until it 
became $8.40 per hour as a lead on the processing floor prior to 
February, 1988. R. at 64, 70. 
3. Accidents at the workplace caused Sharon to make 
workers compensation claims to the Industrial Commission of Utah 
for work-related injuries to her lower back, right arm and neck 
while she was employed at Nordstroms, a self-insured employer. 
R. at 34, 65 and 66. 
4. After informing her employer of back surgery scheduled 
in late November, 1987 to repair a hernia of vertebrae in the 
lower back, Sharon experienced verbal confrontations with a black 
employee during and at her employment. R. at 242, 254, and 60. 
5. Despite her excellent attendance at work, both Sharon 
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and the black co-worker were placed on a 60 day probation 
because, Sharon was told, Nordstroms was having problems with the 
NAACP in Seattle, Washington and her punishment had to be equal 
to that of the black employee. R. at 85, 86, 60 and 61. 
6. Immediately thereafter, at least eight co-workers held 
a conference with Nordstroms management as a show of support for 
Sharon. R. at 141. 
7. At least one co-worker, Brenda Eyer, felt that Sharon 
got along with everyone. R. at 140. 
8. After several weeks off work to have surgery on her 
lower back for a work-related ruptured disk, on about February 
12, 1988 Sharon's manager and ticket maker were both given the 
day off, causing much distress to the new ticket maker. R. at 68 
9. Rather than believe Sharon's version of the events of 
February 12, Maria McArdle, the Distribution Center manager, 
chose to believe an employee not even at work that day, and 
removed Sharon from her job as a lead supervisor, offering a 
claims position as the only alternative for Sharon. R. at 69 and 
303, paragraphs 4 and 5. 
10. Sharon was not able to use her supervisory skills in 
claims, inasmuch as she was the only employee in the department. 
R. at 70. 
11. Sharon found out only after her "transfer" to claims 
that she had lost her six years of seniority on the processing 
floor, her hours would be reduced due to the lack of overtime in 
claims versus the floor generally, and that her salary would be 
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reduced from $8,40 to $7.80 per hour. R. at 70, 71, 91, 92 and 
257. 
12. Upon beginning work in claims, Sharon was shown old 
work needing filing, claim transfers dating back to January 18, 
1988, and was told by the outgoing employee that no one keeps up 
in claims. R. at 199, 105 and 106. 
13. Despite the fact that boxes weighing an average of 40 
pounds were sometimes required to be lifted by Sharon in the 
claims department, Sharon was told by Ms. McArdle that if she had 
to take any time off work from claims due to "any physical thing 
that happened", she would be dismissed or replaced. R. at 74, 
88, 214, and 33. 
14. Not long after commencing work in claims, on about 
March 4, 1988, Sharon experienced a work-related injury to her 
right arm, but returned to work almost immediately despite 
continued pain for fear of her job. R. at 331, 114, and 115. 
15. After continued excellent attendance and almost being 
caught up in claims, Sharon was told on June 10, 1988 that she 
was being put on a 30 day probationary period and that if she was 
not caught up in claims at the end of this 30 day period, she 
would be fired. R. at 85, 86, 192 and 205. 
16. During April, May and June, Sharon was being sued by 
several providers of medical services for overdue accounts 
directly related to the medical services involved in Sharon's 
November 1987 surgery, a January 1987 accident at work, and her 
March 1988 injury to her right arm, each of which Nordstroms had 
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refused to pay and only began its inquiry into the claims in May, 
1988, R. at 16, 268 and 269. 
17. After being threatened with dismissal, getting no 
assistance from her supervisor, Carol Kelly, despite repeated 
requests for help, discovering that her files were being reviewed 
only in her absence, and not being given any real options due to 
her handicaps and the drastic pay and hours cuts associated with 
such "options", Sharon began to desperately search for another 
job. R. at 87, 90, 91, 271 and 33. 
18. On June 24, after two days of several other employees 
working on Sharon's claim transfers without Sharon's being asked 
or even made privy to such work, Sharon was not allowed to begin 
work despite the fact that on June 24, other management employees 
were allowed to work on Sharon's work-in-process. R. at 90, 208. 
19. Upon arriving to work on June 27, Sharon was 
immediately met with accusations of lying, it was very clear to 
Sharon that she would lose her job in 30 days, i.e., July 10, so 
she acquiesced and quit. R. at 90, 91. 
20. The ALJ found in favor of the respondents, which 
decision was affirmed with little comment by the Review Board. 
Sharon now appeals the decision of the Board of Review. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Good cause for the appellant's having terminated employment 
with Nordstroms on June 27, 1988 is established. The appellant 
had already experienced one severe shift in duties wherein her 
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prior expertise was ignored, and her pay and hours reduced. This 
combined with appellant's serious health limitations urge this 
Court to find good cause existed for appellant's having to quit. 
Further, appellant's continued attachments to the labor 
market and her reasonable actions under the circumstances allow 
the Court to award benefits to appellant consistent with equity 
and good conscience, and public policies. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT RESIGNED WITH GOOD CAUSE. 
The first and third issues presented on appeal can both be 
addressed here. U.C.A. Section 35-4-5 A. requires two standards 
of consideration following voluntary separation from employment, 
one of which is "good cause". Pursuant to Section 35-4-5 B.I., 
good cause is established "if continuance of the employment would 
have had an adverse effect on the claimant which could not be 
controlled or prevented and necessitated immediate severance of 
the employment relationship, or if the work was . . . unsuitable 
new work." Subsection B.l.a. states that an adverse effect on 
the claimant "must have been motivated by circumstances which 
made continuance of the employment a hardship or matter of real 
concern sufficiently adverse . . . to outweigh the benefits of 
remaining employed. There must be a showing of actual or 
potential physical, mental, economic, [or] personal . . . harm 
caused or aggravated by continuance in the employment." 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Covington v. Board of Review, 737 
7 
P.2d 207 (Utah 1987), found such good cause to quit where an 
employee for whom a proposed shift in her duties boded a loss of 
expertise and a concomitant loss of income. Similarly, appellant 
Sharon Merriam was harassed and hounded despite a determination 
to maintain her employment with Nordstroms. Her employment 
record was spotless for more than five and one-half years, 
excepting work-related accidents, until in November, 1987 more 
time off for an alleged consequence of an industrial accident 
appears to have changed Nordstrom's attitude? toward Sharon. 
After two probationary periods in less than six months of work, 
Sharon was looking at her only options being in claims, where she 
already knew the work to be overly strenuous for her lifting and 
writing capacities by doctor's request (particularly when Bob 
Lemond was absent on several Mondays), or as a receptionist, 
which job was to have severely cut hours of work,, lower pay, and 
appellant's acceptance of such would necessarily require that her 
daughter-in-law be dismissed. R. at 249, 250. 
If Nordstroms wanted to provide options to appellant, it 
could have offered her one of six light-duty jobs on the 
processing floor. Appellant vigorously disputes that she was 
ever offered the option of jewelry; nevertheless, it is 
acknowledged by Nordstroms that jewelry would have meant less 
than full-time work for appellant. R. at 264. Appellant's 
income dropped from over 40 hours per week at $8.40 per hour to 
around 35 hours per week at $7.80 per hour. This is exactly what 
the Supreme Court had in mind in Covington, supra, when it found 
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the loss of income unacceptable. 
The other element of Covington is also present here: 
appellant stated that her supervisory abilities acquired as a 
lead during some six years of experience would be useless in 
either jewelry, claims, or as a receptionist. Her expertise 
would be completely ignored. And to have consistently ignored 
appellant's testimony in favor of the interested testimony of 
Nordstrom's management also parallels the potential abuses 
checked by the Court in Covington. 
Finally, consistent with Denby v. Board of Review, 567 P.2d 
626 (Utah 1977), the external pressures on appellant, i.e., her 
increasing handicaps as to her ability to accept a claims 
position in claims in the first place and/or to remain in claims, 
were so compelling that a prudent person exercising ordinary 
common sense would be justified in quitting under similar 
circumstances. Despite seeking for other employment, appellant's 
handicaps made it necessary for her to gloss over her injuries 
for serious consideration at other employment. Where the 
appellant is physically or emotionally unable to continue work, 
she need only offer competent testimony that adequate health 
reasons existed to justify her quitting. See, Box Elder County 
v. Industrial Commission, 632 P.2d 839 (Utah 1981). Neither the 
ALJ nor the Board of Review questioned the seriousness of 
appellant's injuries to her right arm and lower back, and in fact 
acknowledged that some limitation of appellant's work activities 
existed. R. at 33. 
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As an end result of such handicaps, appellant has been left 
without ability to do many jobs she might otherwise have been 
qualified. Public policy requires that an interpretation of what 
is good cause should include providing benefits for appellant in 
such circumstances. 
II. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
SUGGEST THAT EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE 
REQUIRE THAT APPELLANT RECEIVE BENEFITS 
This is a case where, should the Court decide that somehow 
appellant did not have the requisite "good cause" to voluntarily 
terminate her employment, another possibility exists under which 
an award of benefits might be based. Section 35-4-5 A. and C., 
where there are mitigating circumstances, equity and good 
conscience may allow payment of benefits if . , . "the claimant 
acted reasonably; [and] . . . the claimant demonstrated a 
continued attachment to the labor market. The ALJ found that, 
indeed, the appellant herein demonstrated continued attachments 
to the labor market. R. at 291. 
The Utah Supreme Court anticipated the importance of 
unfairness and equity in the final determination of benefits 
decisions to persons squeezed out of employment, and stated in 
Salt Lake City Corporation \. Department of Employment Security, 
657 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1982), the commission must consider the 
reasonableness of the claimant's actions and assess the totality 
of the employment situation before bestowing benefits based on 
equity and good conscience. 
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In the instant matter, many facts alone are being ignored as 
irrelevant in the ALJ and Review Board decisions. But these 
facts taken together constitute circumstances where appellant's 
action on June 27, 1988 was reasonable. Appellant was ignored 
when she requested assistance, even after being put on probation 
in June, 1988; appellant was not pounding fists on the desk; 
appellant did not ask to be fired; appellant had done very well 
in her relationships with co-workers; appellant was not informed 
of the consequences of her accepting new work in March, 1988 just 
prior to being terminated, such as loss of seniority, pay cut, 
hours decreased, etc.; appellant was not informed as to why 
others were enlisted to do her work, or even given an opportunity 
to try to catch up on her work to free herself from the 30-day 
probation period; appellant's requests for light work were 
answered only by a refusal to allow her to work on the processing 
floor again, despite at least six jobs on the floor, one of which 
Nordstroms says it offered appellant (albeit with drastically cut 
hours); and finally, being forced to take a day off on June 24, 
the same day that someone else spent 8 hours pouring over 
appellant's desk doing her work. 
The above facts taken together make appellant's reaction to 
false charges of lies and criticisms on the morning of June 27 
very reasonable and prudent. Appellant had maintained a 
continuing relationship to the labor market, and expected 
something to come around shortly, where her skills and expertise 
could again be useful. Equity and good conscience strongly favor 
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the appellant in this case. 
Appellant urges the Court to go one step further and find 
that, in reviewing the facts of this case, in Utah, like 
Oklahoma, Nevada, Oregon and Indiana, retaliatory discharge for 
filing a workmen's compensation claim is a wrongful, 
unconscionable act actionable in a Court of law. See, e.g., 
Buckner v. General Motors Corp., 260 P.2d 803 (Okla. 1988), Brown 
v. Transcom Lines, 284 Or 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978), Hansen v. 
Harrahs', 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has found herself in extreme hardships due to the 
refusal of her former employer Nordstroms to pay back medical 
bills, and the refusal of State assistance where a claim for 
worker's compensation is pending. Where appellant has no real 
possibility to work at menial labor jobs due to her handicaps, 
the circumstances of her having to leave employment where she 
consistently was one of the first to arrive and the last to leave 
are extremely important. Appellant is alone in her petitions to 
this Court, and has no way of funding the same. She pleads that 
this Court will give proper weight to her testimony and find that 
the situation at Nordstroms generated a voluntary quit with good 
cause or, in the alternative, that equity and good conscience 
require that appellant receive unemployment insurance benefits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f ^ S^day of J u ^ g, 1988. 
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DWIGHT EPPERSON, Attorney for 
Appellant Sharon H. Merriam 
36 South State St., Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 322-5062 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to be mailed, postage prepaid, to 
the following on this * 5> day of >yJcv\&, ., 19^7: 
Winston M. Faux 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Department of Employment Security 
1234 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 11600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
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U.C.A. S e c t i o n 35-1+-5 
A, The Act requires two standards of consideration following 
a voluntary separation from employment: good cause and equity 
and_good conscience. If the claimant fails to establish good 
cause for leaving work, unemployment insurance benefits will 
not be denied if a denial of benefits would be contrary to the 
equity and good conscience standard. 
B. 1. Good cause is established if continuance of the employ-
ment would have had an adverse effect on the claimant which 
could not be controlled or prevented and necessitated immediate 
severance of the employment relationship, on if the work was . 
illegal, or unsuitable new work. 
B. 1. a. Adverse Effect on the Claimant 
The separation must have been motivated by circumstances which 
made continuance of the employment a hardship or matter of real 
concern sufficiently adverse to a reasonable person to outweigh 
the benefits of remaining employed. There must be a showing 
of actual or potential physical, mental, economic, personal or 
professional harm caused or aggravated by continuance in the 
employment. The claimant's reason(s) for belief of the conse-
quences of remaining on the job must be real, not imaginary; 
substantial, not trifling. These circumstances must be applied 
as to the average individual, not the supersensitive. 
B. 1. b. Ability to Control or Prevent 
Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect on the 
claimant good cause is not established if the claimant: 
(1) reasonably could have continued working while looking for 
other employment, or 
(2) had reasonable alternatives that would have made it pos-
sible for him to preserve his job through approved leave, 
transfer, or adjustment to personal circumstances, etc., or, 
(3) had not given the employer notice of the circumstances 
causing the hardship so the employer would have an opportunity 
to make adjustments which would alleviate the need to quit. An 
employee with grievances about his employment must show an 
effort to work out the problems with the employer unless such 
efforts would be futile. 
C. Equity and Good Conscience 
1. When the circumstances of the quit were not sufficiently 
compelling to justify an allowance of benefits for good cause, 
but there were mitigating circumstances, and a denial of bene-
fits would be unreasonably harsh or an affront to fairness, 
benefits may be allowed under the provisions of equity and good 
conscience if: • • . the claimant acted reasonably; . . . the 
claimant demonstrated a continued attachment to the labor 
market. 
